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I. Introduction 
  
The average age of a firm going public during the 1990’s was the lowest the 
market has witnessed since World War I. 1  With a mean time from incorporation to 
public offering of roughly ten years, the average 1990’s IPO was about one-third as old 
as a typical mid-20th century IPO.  A useful model for understanding why IPO’s went to 
market so young during this period has been offered by Jovanovic and Rousseau.2  They 
view the duration of the pre-IPO waiting phase as the result of a trade off between firm 
learning and the opportunity cost related to delay to market.  Prior to a firm’s IPO, 
management refines the enterprise’s idea and strategy, while early investors and creditors 
assess the firm’s potential, risks and optimal deployment of capital.  Since the post-IPO 
capital investment will be irreversible, this learning process is very important because it 
reduces the possibility of a costly mistake.  Yet the pre-IPO learning period delays the 
realization of revenues for the firm, creating an opportunity cost that varies depending on 
the quality of the idea.  The firm will therefore attempt to maximize net present value in 
terms of these two factors by finding the optimal time for its IPO.  Holding all else equal, 
the better a firm’s idea, product or business model, the greater the opportunity cost of 
delay, and the earlier the firm will go public.  The low average age-at-IPO during the 
1990’s may therefore indicate an era of unusually promising firms.   
Given this explanation, a reasonable question to ask is whether the market was 
able to accurately gauge the high potential of the firms in this period, particularly the 
youngest firms.  Theoretically, in an efficient market, the aftermarket price of an IPO will 
almost immediately reflect the growth potential of the firm, based on all available 
                                                 
1 Jovanovic, Boyan, and Peter L. Rousseau. “Why Wait? A Century of Life Before IPO.” NBER Working 
Paper No. 8081. (January 2001). 
2 Jovanovic and Rousseau. 
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information.  Average risk-adjusted returns going forward should match the market, 
regardless of the age-at-IPO of a firm. This study is designed to examine the relationship 
between the age of firms at IPO and long-run aftermarket performance.  In effect, the 
study will test the efficiency of the market with regard to the IPO’s during the 1991 to 
1997 period by measuring three-year holding period excess stock returns relative to firm 
age-at-IPO.  In light of the technology-heavy character of the recent IPO period, the study 
also segments data into technology and non-technology panels in order to ascertain if 
there is an age-performance relationship peculiar to technology firms.   
Consistent with prior research, we find overall negative abnormal returns for the 
whole sample of IPO’s during the study period.  We also find that a statistically 
significant positive relationship exists between age-at-IPO and aftermarket performance 
for the overall sample in this period.  After we disaggregate the data, we observe that the 
age-return relationship is different for technology and non-technology firms.  Non-
technology firms exhibit a positive monotone relationship between firm age-at-IPO and 
abnormal returns, with a high degree of statistical significance.   Among technology 
enterprises, on the other hand, very young firms outperformed older firms, particularly 
during the 1995 to 1997 IPO period.   On the whole, the technology panel exhibited a 
statistically significant negative correlation between age and excess returns.  Finally, an 
examination of distressed de-listing rates shows that younger firms, particularly young 
technology firms, were more likely to suffer extreme financial difficulty during the 1991 
to 1997 period. 
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II. Data Selection and Methodology 
 
 The sample data set for this study is comprised of 1,234 companies that had U.S. 
common stock initial public offerings between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 1997.  
The sample data has been gathered from two primary sources: the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database.   
Firms were selected for the study if they satisfied two criteria: first, the SDC 
database had to have incorporation and IPO date information for the firm; second, CRSP 
had to have accurate price, return and de-listing data.  Out of roughly 4,000 IPO’s for the 
period3, 1,234 firms met these criteria.  
Firms were classified into one of fourteen industry designations based on SIC 
codes and Yahoo.com profile descriptions.  While some subjective judgment was 
required in the industry designation exercise, the result improves upon the SIC code 
designations because many technology-based companies receive peculiar coding in the 
1987 SIC system.  The data was segmented into two panels, technology firms and non-
technology firms, based on the fourteen industry designations.  The technology panel 
combined the “hard” technology, “soft” technology, biotech and telecom industry 
categories, while the rest of the categories formed the non-technology panel. 
Firm age-at-IPO was computed from the date of incorporation to the date of IPO, 
and is listed in the data in monthly units.  Historically, IPO firms have been incorporated 
on average ten or more years after founding.4  The gap between the two began to close 
dramatically starting in the mid-1970’s, and averaged only a year or two in the 1990’s.  
                                                 
3 www.marketdata.nasdaq.com. 
4 Jovanovic & Rousseau. 
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Regardless, incorporation data is far more accessible than founding data, so the study 
defines age-at-IPO with reference to date of incorporation rather than date of founding. 
 The study compiled holding period excess returns for the three-year period 
following the first month’s closing price after each firm’s IPO.  Excess returns were 
calculated by comparing the firm’s holding period return to the CRSP value-weighted 
total stock market index (NYSE + NASDAQ + AMEX) return for the same period.  The 
excess return for each IPO is defined as follows: 
     
  Xt  =  ((Pt-Po)/Po)-((It-Io)/Io), 
 
where: 
 
Xt = the excess return for each IPO firm 
 
Pt = the closing price of the IPO security t months after the offering, adjusted  
for stock dividends and splits; 
 
Po = the closing price of the IPO security at the end of the calendar month  
in which the offering was issued; 
 
Io = the value of the CRSP value-weighted total stock market index at the end  
of the calendar month in which the offering was issued; 
 
It = the value of the CRSP value-weighted total stock market index t months 
  after the offering. 
 
  
 While most of the IPO’s in the data set survived the three-year aftermarket period 
used in the study, some firms were de-listed prior to the 36th month.  For de-listed firms, 
the last CRSP stock price listing was used to calculate a holding period return for the 
security, measured against the market return for the same period. 
 The method used in this study for calculating aftermarket excess holding period 
returns implicitly assumes that the systematic risk of each IPO mirrors that of the CRSP 
whole market index.  Unfortunately, this assumption is not valid for IPO firms.  
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Academic research indicates that the systematic risk of IPO’s is generally higher than that 
of a whole market index.  For example, Ibbotson estimated the average IPO beta at 2.2, 
Reilly at 1.97 (relative to NASDAQ), and Buser and Chan at 1.54.5  As a result of the 
higher average beta, the reported excess returns are upward-biased estimates of the risk-
adjusted abnormal returns. 
 Finally, distressed de-listing rates were calculated using de-listing and price 
information data from the CRSP database.  A firm was considered a distressed de-listing 
if it traded at a price equal to or below one dollar in the period in which it was de-listed.  
 
III. Summary Data 
 
 Table 1 shows the number of IPO’s that occurred in each year from 1991 to 1997, 
and the number of IPO observations included in the study from each of those years. The 
percentage of IPO’s included in 1996 and 1997 are higher than previous years because 
the SDC database has more incorporation data from more recent years.    
 
Table 1: Total IPO’s Per Year By Market and Study 
 
The age of firms, measured from incorporation date to issue date, varied from less 
than one month to over 1,000 months.  The oldest firm was 1,151 months old at IPO.   On 
                                                 
5 Ibbotson, R.G., “Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues,” Journal of Financial Economics 
(1975); Reilly, F.K., “New Issues Revisited,” Financial Management (1977); Buser, S.A. and K.C. Chan, 
“NASDAQ/NMS Qualification Standards, Ohio Registration Experience and the Price Performance of 
Initial Public Offerings,” Columbus, Ohio Department of Commerce and National Association of Securities 
Dealers (1987). 
Year NASDAQ NYSE Amex Total # In Study % in Study
1991 320 49 11 380 66 17.4%
1992 442 80 6 528 85 16.1%
1993 520 97 11 628 164 26.1%
1994 444 82 13 539 127 23.6%
1995 476 72 9 557 121 21.7%
1996 680 88 18 786 322 41.0%
1997 494 87 22 603 349 57.9%
Total 3376 555 90 4021 1234 30.7%
Source: www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/Sec3IPO.asp
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average, health care firms for this period were the youngest at IPO, though the median 
real estate IPO was far younger than any other industry median.  As one would expect, 
industrial and retail firms were, on average, the most mature at IPO.  Table 2 indicates 
the average and median age of the included IPO’s in each industry category. 
 
 
Table 2: Age Data By Industry (in months) 
 
 
 
IV. Previous Research  
 
Long-Run Aftermarket Performance of IPO’s 
 
 Numerous academic studies have been performed on the long-run aftermarket 
performance of IPOs.   Virtually all of these studies have found substantial 
underperformance relative to either the market or a sample of matched firms.  In addition, 
at least one study has examined the post-IPO operating performance of issuing firms.  
The following is a brief synopsis of the academic research on post-IPO performance. 
Ritter (1991) documented significant 3-year IPO underperformance in the 1975 to 
1984 period using a sample of 1,526 IPOs.6  Ritter’s data set yielded average holding 
period returns of 34.5%, versus a non-IPO sample, matched by industry and market 
                                                 
6 Ritter, Jay. “The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings.” The Journal of Finance (March 
1991).   
Industry Number of Offerings Average Age Median Age
Agriculture 27 189.6 60.0
Biotech 138 92.6 59.1
Broadcast/Publishing 26 80.5 52.4
Consumer Products 67 167.1 91.6
Energy/Utilities/Mining 34 185.9 74.5
Financial 98 131.5 52.8
Health Care 52 71.3 47.0
Industrial 162 221.0 111.3
Real Estate 62 113.5 9.9
Retail 88 207.4 111.8
Service 140 168.7 90.7
Technology - Hard 118 115.7 91.4
Technology- Soft 173 98.6 84.7
Telecom 49 94.0 66.9
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value, which yielded an average return for the same period of 61.9%.  This is a negative 
excess return of 26.4% using the method utilized in this study.  He also found a positive 
monotone relationship between firm age and IPO aftermarket performance, with the 
oldest category of firms (over 20 years) showing positive abnormal returns. Ritter 
concludes that the market systematically overestimates the long-term growth 
opportunities of firms going public.   
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) examined IPO 250-day aftermarket holding period 
returns for the 1977 to 1987 period.7  The 1,598 firms in the study had an average 
abnormal return relative to the NASDAQ market of –13.73%.  The authors suggested that 
the average excess return was a conservative estimate because average IPO betas are 
greater than one, and the study period was dominated by a rising market.  They conclude 
that the results provide support for the presence of fads in the IPO market. 
Reilly (1977) found negative one-year aftermarket abnormal returns for IPOs in 
the early 1970’s.8  He concluded, however, that the underperformance was due largely to 
the falling market of 1973-74, which, coupled with the higher systematic risk of the new 
issues, amplified the negative excess returns. 
Buser and Chan (1987), on the other hand, found positive two-year market-
adjusted returns of 11.2% in the 1981-1985 IPO aftermarket for NASDAQ/NMS-eligible 
offerings.9  The authors used the NASDAQ Composite Index to adjust the returns of the 
1,087 firms in their sample.  According to Ritter (1991), Buser and Chan is the only 
aftermarket performance study that does not find negative post-IPO abnormal returns. 
                                                 
7 Aggarwal, Reena and Pietra Rivoli. “Fads in the Initial Public Offering Market?” Financial Management 
(1990). 
8 Reilly, F.K.. “New Issues Revisited.” Financial Management (1977). 
9 Buser, Stephen A. and K.C. Chan. “NASDAQ/NMS Qualification Standards, Ohio Registration 
Experience and the Price Performance of Initial Public Offerings.” Columbus, Ohio Department of 
Commerce and National Association of Securities Dealer, Inc. (1987). 
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Finally, Jain and Kini (1994) examined the post-IPO operating performance of 
682 firms that IPO’d between 1976 and 1988, and documented a decline in the average 
operating performance of issuing firms after IPO, as measured by operating return on 
assets.10  The authors conclude that the market appears to value recently issued securities 
based on the expectation that the firms’ pre-IPO growth in fundamentals will continue, 
while in actuality performance tends to decline, often sharply. 
 
Pre-IPO Waiting Period Duration 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, as we mentioned in the introduction, modeled the IPO 
waiting-period as a learning phase, in which early investors, lenders and management 
assess the products, prospects and risks of the firm.  The model focuses on the trade off 
between the risk-reducing nature of the learning period, and the opportunity cost 
associated with a delay to market.  The greater the opportunity cost - in other words the 
better the idea or business model - the sooner a firm will go public.  They argued that the 
1990’s IT-era firms went public at a young age because the technologies they introduced 
were too productive to be “kept out very long,” and conclude that late 19th century 
electrification era firms fit a similar pattern. 
 
V. Results 
 Overall Aftermarket Stock Performance  
 Table 3 reports the average and median three-year holding period and excess 
return for the entire 1,234 firms in the sample.  The average holding period return is 
substantially higher than the median, due to some extremely high-return firms such as 
                                                 
10 Jain, Bharat A. & Omesh Kini. “The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms.”  Journal of 
Finance (1994). 
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BEA Systems, Inc., which had the highest holding period return (1,254.17%) and excess 
return (1,177.98%) in the data set. 
 
Table 3: Overall Holding Period and Excess Returns    
 
To examine the relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance, the 
study grouped the firms by age into quintiles.  The results of the holding period excess 
return calculations for the whole sample are shown below in Figure 1, and in more detail 
in Table 4. 
 
Figure 1:  Post-IPO Performance by Quintile 
 
 
Table 4: Post-IPO Excess Holding Period Returns by Quintile 
 
 
 The quintile data for the total sample reveals no clear correlation between firm 
age and post-IPO performance.  Firms in the first (youngest) quintile, which average less 
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Quintile # of Observations Avg Age Avg Excess Return
1 247 0.1 25.4 10.8 -56.05%
2 247 25.5 55.3 41.4 -35.38%
3 246 55.4 102.2 78.8 -45.99%
4 247 102.2 200.4 140.6 -52.35%
5 247 200.6 1151.5 433.6 -38.23%
Range in Months
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than a year in age, showed negative excess returns of over 56% relative to the market, the 
worst performance by any quintile.  Excess returns improved considerably in the second 
quintile, where firms averaged about 3.5 years of age. The oldest quintile had excess 
returns substantially better than the first quintile as well, though the range in months for 
the fifth quintile is so wide that it would be difficult to draw much of a conclusion from 
the result.  Using a two-sample t-test to assess the difference between quintile 1 and the 
rest of the sample, we find that the difference in average excess return is marginally 
statistically significant.  Exhibit 1 shows the results of the test. 
 In order to test for an overall relationship between age and excess return, we 
perform a regression analysis, using excess holding period return as the target variable.  
Excess returns in the sample have a long right-tailed distribution, with some extreme 
outliers that distort regression results.  The analysis therefore censors the extreme 
outliers, attaching a value of 200% excess holding period return to any observation with 
an excess return over 200%.  There were approximately 40 observations that fit this 
criterion.  Also, we have used a log (natural log) transformation for age-at-IPO, and have 
censored very low outliers by attaching a value of four months to any observation below 
four months of age-at-IPO.  We used dummy variables for each industry designation 
(save one) and each IPO-year (save one) to control for those factors, and we performed 
the regression without an intercept.  The regression results indicate that excess returns are 
positively associated with logged age-at-IPO at a statistically significant level for the 
overall sample (t-statistic of 1.83, p-value of 0.068).  The coefficient for the logged age 
variable is 0.0316, indicating that a 100% increase in firm age is associated with a 3.16% 
increase in three-year holding period excess return, holding everything else constant.  See 
Exhibit 2 for more detailed information concerning the regression results. 
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Aftermarket Performance of Technology Firms 
The 1990’s witnessed a technology-heavy IPO market, with many very young 
firms going public.  The next sections of the study disaggregate the data into two broad 
panels in order to examine the relationship between age and performance for both 
technology and non-technology firms. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between technology firm age and excess stock 
returns for the 1991-97 IPO period.  Unlike the overall data, the graphical representation 
of the average excess returns seems to indicate a negative correlation between age and 
aftermarket performance.  The youngest technology firms (first quintile firms were less 
than two years old) in the panel dramatically outperformed every other quintile.   The 
excess returns for all technology quintiles were superior (less negative) to the overall 
results, a reflection of the surging technology stock market during the 1990’s.  Table 5 
shows the return data in more detail.  
 
 
Figure 2: Technology Firm Returns Relative to Age-at-IPO 
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Table 5: Post-IPO Technology Firm Returns by Quintile 
 
 
  
Despite the difference in average returns between the first quintile and the other 
quintiles, a two-sample t-test indicates that the gap is not statistically significant at the 
0.95 confidence level, due largely to high standard errors.  Exhibit 3 shows the details of 
the two-sample t-test.  Nonetheless, the divergence in average returns is an interesting 
result.  The superior average returns for young technology firms may indicate that the 
market during this period underestimated the growth potential of such firms (or 
overestimated the prospects of young firms less than old firms, since average returns are 
negative).  Alternatively, the result may indicate that the industries in which these young 
firms operate have particularly high betas, producing relatively higher returns during the 
rising market of 1991-2000.  In particular, the 1995-2000 period was an unusually bullish 
growth period for the market.  
A regression for the technology panel, using the same characteristics as the 
regression for the overall sample, indicates a negative relationship between age and 
excess return that is statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.82, p-value 0.70).  The 
coefficient of the logged age variable is –0.062, indicating that a 100% increase in firm 
age is associated with a 6.2% fall in three year excess return, everything else held equal. 
Exhibit 4 shows more detail for this regression result. 
The study further disaggregates the technology firm data into panels for the 1991-
94 period and the 1995-1997 period, in order to ascertain whether the young technology 
Quintile # of Observations Avg Age Avg Excess Return
1 96 0.1 39.1 22.3 -5.49%
2 95 39.1 58.6 48.3 -34.01%
3 96 58.7 92.7 75.9 -34.31%
4 95 93.3 145.2 115.2 -36.19%
5 96 145.6 993.7 240.8 -33.79%
Range in Months
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firms outperformed older firms during the whole study period.  The results appear in 
Figure 3 and 4, and in more detail in Table 6 and 7. 
 
Figure 3: Technology Firm Returns (1991-94) 
 
Figure 4: Technology Firm Returns (1995-97) 
 
 
Table 6: Post-IPO Technology Firm Returns by Quintile (1991-94) 
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1 28 1.6 43.1 27.8 -25.12%
2 27 43.1 66.3 53.0 -28.94%
3 28 66.4 96.9 80.7 -4.25%
4 27 97.1 133.7 113.3 -12.27%
5 28 135.5 993.7 232.2 -13.68%
Range in Months
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Table 7: Post-IPO Technology Firm Returns by Quintile (1995-97) 
 
 
 
 Though the sample size of the earlier period is too small to assume statistical 
significance for the differences between quintiles (only 27 or 28 observations per 
quintile), the difference between the first quintiles in each panel relative to the other 
quintiles is nonetheless worth noting.  The results here suggest that something peculiar to 
the late 1990’s technology-driven bull market may have played a role in the better than 
expected results for young technology firms.  Again, one possible explanation is that the 
betas for such firms are higher than older technology firms, and therefore returns were 
amplified during the dramatically rising market during the 1995-2000 period.     
It is also possible that the market simply underestimated the prospects of these 
unusually young firms, relative to older firms, in the immediate aftermarket following 
IPO.   Since the average age of IPO firms in the 1990’s was the lowest in almost a 
century, the implication, in line with Jovanovic and Rousseau’s model, is that the market 
potential of these very young firms may have been substantially higher than firms in prior 
IPO periods.  Though many of the recent young IPO’s showed remarkably high initial 
valuations, it is possible that the market still managed to underestimate these firms’ 
potential relative to their older cohorts.  
 
 
 
 
 
Quintile # of Observations Avg Age Avg Excess Return
1 68 0.0 36.3 20.6 1.87%
2 68 36.6 57.3 46.4 -40.52%
3 68 57.6 91.5 73.7 -40.74%
4 68 91.6 148.2 116.2 -51.73%
5 68 148.4 704.8 243.9 -36.76%
Range in Months
16 
Aftermarket Performance of Non-Technology Firms 
 
The data for the non-technology panel indicates a positive monotone correlation 
between age and aftermarket performance, mirroring Ritter’s result for IPO’s in the 1975-
84 period.  Figure 5 illustrates this graphically, and Table 8 presents the non-technology 
panel results in more detail.  A regression, again using the same characteristics as the 
regression for the overall sample, shows a highly statistically significant relationship 
between logged age-at-IPO and censored excess holding period return (t-statistic of 2.81, 
p-value of 0.005), and a coefficient for the logged age variable of 0.0467, which suggests 
that, holding all else constant, a 100% increase in firm age is associated with a 4.67% rise 
in excess three year holding period returns.  More detailed information for this regression 
result appears in the appendix in Exhibit 5. 
Figure 5: Non-Technology Firm Returns Relative to Age-at-IPO 
 
 
 
Avg. 3 Year Holding Period Excess Return
1 2
3
4
5
-70.00%
-60.00%
-50.00%
-40.00%
-30.00%
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
Quintiles (Youngest to Oldest)
H
ol
di
ng
 P
er
io
d 
Ex
ce
ss
 
R
et
ur
n
17 
 
Table 8: Post-IPO Non-Technology Firm Returns by Quintile 
 
 
 Distressed De-listing Rates 
 
 Figure 6 and Table 9 present the distressed de-listing percentages for the total 
sample, and each of the sector panels.  The data matches what we would expect 
intuitively: younger firms are more likely to experience financial distress and de-list.  
This relationship between age-at-IPO and distressed de-listing holds up for both 
technology and non-technology firms, though young technology firms in particular 
appear more likely to experience post-IPO operating difficulty, with a rate over 8%. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of Distressed De-Listings During Holding Period 
 
Table 9: Post-IPO Distressed De-Listing Rates By Quintile and Panel 
  
 
 
Quintile Technology Non-Technology Total Sample
1 8.33% 6.62% 7.29%
2 4.21% 5.30% 5.26%
3 1.04% 1.97% 2.03%
4 5.26% 3.31% 3.24%
5 1.04% 1.99% 1.62%
Distressed De-Listing Rates By Quintile
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Technology Non-Technology Total Sample
Quintile # of Observations Avg Age Avg Excess Return
1 151 0.1 15.8 7.0 -62.81%
2 151 15.9 52.3 33.8 -60.82%
3 152 52.5 112.0 82.0 -58.00%
4 151 112.4 260.3 172.5 -53.77%
5 151 261.2 1151.5 538.8 -45.92%
Range in Months
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6. Conclusion 
 
 This study documented overall IPO-aftermarket underperformance during the 
1991 to 1997 period, which is consistent with the majority of prior research conducted in 
other periods.  In the aggregate, the data shows a statistically significant correlation 
between firm age-at-IPO and post-IPO excess returns.  However, when the firms were 
disaggregated into technology and non-technology panels, the data suggested that the 
relationship between age and returns is different between the two categories.   
Among technology enterprises, very young firms outperformed older firms, 
though the difference in return between the two age groups did not rise to a high level of 
statistical significance.  We note that the performance of young technology firms may 
have been a peculiar result, distorted by the dramatically rising market of 1995-2000.  
The study also offers the alternative idea that the market may have underestimated the 
unusually strong prospects of this group of young technology IPO’s relative to older 
technology firms.   
Non-technology firms, on the other hand, exhibited a positive monotone 
correlation between firm age and excess holding period returns.  A regression confirmed 
this positive relationship, established at a high degree of statistical significance.   
Finally, the study examined the distressed de-listing rates for the three-year period 
following IPO for the data set, and found a consistent negative relationship between age-
at-IPO and distressed de-listings for both technology and non-technology firms. 
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Exhibits 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
TWO-SAMPLE T-TEST for QUINTILE 1 vs. OTHER QUINTILES, OVERALL SAMPLE
N Mean StDev SE Mean
Quintile 1 247 -0.56 1.05 0.067
Other Quin. 987 -0.43 1.16 0.037
Difference = mu Quintile 1 - mu Other Quintiles
Estimate for difference: -0.1306
95% CI for difference: (-0.2805, 0.0192)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.71 P-Value = 0.087 DF = 411
 
Exhibit 2 
REGRESSION USING OVERALL SAMPLE, CENSORED RETURNS & LOGGED CENSORED AGE
The regression equation is
Censored Return = 0.0316 LogAge - 0.070 1992 - 0.205 1993 - 0.293 1994
- 0.371 1995 - 0.672 1996 - 0.461 1997 - 0.617 AG - 0.317 EUM
- 0.236 RE - 0.373 IND - 0.348 RET - 0.513 CON - 0.162 INF
- 0.223 BIO - 0.439 HEA - 0.289 SER - 0.057 TECH - 0.093 IT
- 0.108 FIN
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Noconstant
LogAge 0.03160 0.01731 1.83 0.068
S = 0.8712
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 20 402.474 20.124 26.51 0.000
Residual Error 1214 921.389 0.759
Total 1234 1323.863
Exhibit 3
TWO-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR QUINTILE 1 vs. OTHER QUINTILES, TECHNOLOGY FIRMS
N Mean StDev SE Mean
Quintile 96 -0.05 2.01 0.21
Other Qu 382 -0.35 1.25 0.064
Difference = mu Quintile 1 - mu Other Quintiles
Estimate for difference: 0.291
95% CI for difference: (-0.135, 0.717)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.35 P-Value = 0.179 DF = 113
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Exhibit 4 
 
REGRESSION USING TECHNOLOGY PANEL, CENSORED RETURNS & LOGGED CENSORED AGE
The regression equation is
Censored Return = - 0.0620 LogAge + 0.033 1992 + 0.091 1993 - 0.156 1994
- 0.328 1995 - 0.540 1996 - 0.041 1997 + 0.140 TECH + 0.082 IT
+ 0.230 TEL
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Noconstant
LogAge -0.06202 0.03414 -1.82 0.070
S = 0.9914
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 10 106.557 10.656 10.84 0.000
Residual Error 468 460.027 0.983
Total 478 566.584
 
 
Exhibit 5 
 
REGRESSION USING NON-TECHNOLOGY PANEL, CENSORED RETURNS & LOGGED CENSORED AGE
The regression equation is
Censored Return = 0.0467 LogAge - 0.220 1992 - 0.430 1993 - 0.468 1994
- 0.417 1995 - 0.816 1996 - 0.799 1997 - 0.456 AG - 0.169 EUM
- 0.068 RE - 0.247 IND - 0.242 RET - 0.380 CON - 0.015 INF
- 0.284 HEA - 0.139 SER
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Noconstant
LogAge 0.04670 0.01665 2.81 0.005
S = 0.7703
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 16 318.199 19.887 33.52 0.000
Residual Error 740 439.079 0.593
Total 756 757.279
 
 
